Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network deployments during the COVID-19 pandemic, WHO Western Pacific Region.

Problem: The Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN) has responded to more than 100 outbreaks during the past 23 years. The coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic presented unprecedented operational constraints that challenged GOARN's core mission to rapidly deploy technical experts from its partners to support national in-country responses to public health emergencies. This paper describes the type and duration of GOARN deployments to and within the World Health Organization's (WHO's) Western Pacific Region during the COVID-19 pandemic. Context: Despite strict border closures and ever-changing vaccination and quarantine requirements, GOARN continued to deploy international technical assistance to strengthen COVID-19 response operations within the Region, as requested. Action: Data were analysed from the GOARN Knowledge Platform about deployments to and within the Region for responses to the COVID-19 pandemic between 1 January 2020 and 5 May 2023. Data were available about deployment duration, technical role requested, country or area, partner organization and deployed expert's demographics. Feedback from postdeployment briefings with the experts was collected and thematically analysed to determine ongoing needs and gaps to help improve deployment operations. Outcome: There were 72 experts deployed on 89 missions through GOARN to 12 countries and areas in the Region, for a total of 4558 field days, to support the response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Discussion: The volume of requests for assistance from countries and areas in the Region to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic uncovered a deficit in human resources available for domestic response to outbreaks and the reliance on international assistance. Strengthening the in-country capacity of ready-to-respond public health emergency staff is critical to meet the needs for outbreak response. The ongoing demand for technical experts to support national responses means that these lessons may have immediate implications.

Prolonged carriage of OXA-244-carbapenemase-producing Escherichia coli complicates epidemiological investigations.

The rapid increase of OXA-244-producing Escherichia coli, predominantly driven by genetically clustered isolates of sequence type (ST)38, has been observed in at least nine European countries, including Germany. However, the reasons for the spread of OXA-244-producing E. coli remain unclear. Here, we aim to evaluate the possibility of prolonged carriage. We identified a total of six different patients with repeated detection of OXA-244-producing E. coli isolates, which were subjected to both short and long-read whole-genome sequencing (WGS). Besides allelic differences using core genome multilocus sequence typing (cgMLST) analyses, we obtained numbers of single-nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) to calculate individual base-pair substitution (BPS) rates. To assess possible re-exposure and risk factors for prolonged carriage, case interviews were conducted. The time between detections ranged from eleven months to more than three years. Initial isolates originated in three+ out of six cases from clinical samples, whereas remaining samples were from screening, mostly in the inpatient setting. As expected, cgMLST analyses showed low numbers of allelic differences between isolates of each case ranging from 1 to 4, whereas numbers of SNPs were between 2 and 99 (mean = 36), thus clearly highlighting the discrepancy between these different bacterial typing approaches. For five out of six cases, observed BPS rates suggest that patients can be colonized with OXA-244-producing E. coli, including ST38 cluster isolates, for extensively long times. Thus, we may have previously missed the epidemiological link between cases because exposure to OXA-244-producing E. coli could have occurred in a time frame, which has not been evaluated in previous investigations. Our results may help to guide future epidemiological investigations as well as to support the interpretation of genetic diversity of OXA-244-producing E. coli, particularly among ST38 cluster isolates.

Germany's Burden of Disease of Bloodstream Infections Due to Vancomycin-Resistant Enterococcus faecium between 2015-2020.

In Germany, there is an increasing amount of vancomycin-resistant Enterococcus faecium (VREfm) isolates in bloodstream infections (BSIs); however, estimates on recent incidences and disease burden are missing. We aim to estimate the incidence and calculate the annual disease burden in disease-adjusted life years (DALYs) for BSIs due to VREfm in Germany between 2015 and 2020 to support informed decision-making in the field of antimicrobial resistance (AMR). We used the Antibiotic Resistance Surveillance (ARS) system data to obtain incidence estimates. The estimated incidences were used in the Burden of Communicable Disease in Europe (BCoDE) toolkit to calculate the attributable DALYs. A total of 3417 VREfm blood culture-positive isolates were observed within ARS. The estimated incidence of VREfm-BSIs per 100,000 inhabitants increased from 1.4 (95% Uncertainty Interval [UI]: 0.8−1.9) in 2015 to 2.9 (95% UI: 2.4−3.3) in 2020. The estimated burden, expressed in DALYs per 100,000 inhabitants, increased from 8.5 (95% UI: 7.3−9.7; YLD = 0.9, YLL = 7.6) in 2015 to 15.6 (95% UI: 14.6−16.6; YLD = 1.6, YLL = 14) in 2020. The most affected groups within the observed period are the 65−69-year-old males with 262.9 DALYs per 100,000 inhabitants, and in the younger age groups (<30 years), the under-one-year-old with 43.1 DALYs per 100,000 inhabitants and 34.5 DALYs for male and female, respectively. The increasing DALYs of BSIs due to VREfm require targeted prevention and control measures to address their unequal distribution across gender and age, especially for older hospitalized patients, neonates, and infants in Germany.

Antibiotic resistance in hospital-acquired ESKAPE-E infections in low- and lower-middle-income countries: a systematic review and meta-analysis.

Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) and hospital-acquired infections (HAIs) are global health challenges. The burden of antibiotic resistance in HAIs is still unclear in low- and lower-middle-income countries (L-LMICs). This study summarizes recent data on antibiotic resistance in priority HAIs (ESKAPE-E) in L-LMICs and compares them with data from high-income countries (HICs). EMBASE, Web of Science, and Global Index Medicus were searched for studies on AMR patterns in HAIs published from 01/2010 to 10/2020. Random-effects meta-analyses were performed to obtain pooled estimates. In total, 163 eligible studies were included in the review and meta-analysis. The pooled methicillin resistance proportion in Staphylococcus aureus was 48.4% (95% confidence interval [95%CI] 41·7-55·2, n = 80). Pooled carbapenem resistance proportions were high in Gram-negative pathogens: Escherichia coli: 16·6% (95%CI 10·7-23·4, n = 60); Klebsiella pneumoniae: 34·9% (95%CI 24·6-45·9, n = 50); Pseudomonas aeruginosa: 37.1% (95%CI 24·6-45·9, n = 56); Enterobacter spp.: 51·2% (95%CI 27·5-74·7, n = 7); and Acinetobacter baumannii (complex): 72·4% (95%CI 62·1-81·7%, n = 36). A higher resistance proportions were observed for third-generation cephalosporins: Klebsiella pneumoniae: 78·7% (95%CI 71·5-85·2, n = 46); Escherichia coli: 78·5% (95%CI 72·1-84·2%, n = 58); and Enterobacter spp.: 83·5% (95%CI 71·9-92·8, n = 8). We observed a high between-study heterogeneity (I2 > 80%), which could not be explained by our set of moderators. Pooled resistance proportions for Gram-negative pathogens were higher in L-LMICs than regional and national estimates from HICs. Patients in resource-constrained regions are particularly affected by AMR. To combat the high resistance to critical antibiotics in L-LMICs, and bridge disparities in health, it is crucial to strengthen local surveillance and the health systems in general.

Hospital-acquired infections caused by enterococci: a systematic review and meta-analysis, WHO European Region, 1 January 2010 to 4 February 2020.

BackgroundHospital-acquired infections (HAI) caused by Enterococcus spp., especially vancomycin-resistant Enterococcusspp. (VRE), are of rising concern.AimWe summarised data on incidence, mortality and proportion of HAI caused by enterococci in the World Health Organization European Region.MethodsWe searched Medline and Embase for articles published between 1 January 2010 and 4 February 2020. Random-effects meta-analyses were performed to obtain pooled estimates.ResultsWe included 75 studies. Enterococcus spp. and VRE accounted for 10.9% (95% confidence interval (CI): 8.7-13.4; range: 6.1-17.5) and 1.1% (95% CI: 0.21-2.7; range: 0.39-2.0) of all pathogens isolated from patients with HAI. Hospital wide, the pooled incidence of HAI caused by Enterococcus spp. ranged between 0.7 and 24.8 cases per 1,000 patients (pooled estimate: 6.9; 95% CI: 0.76-19.0). In intensive care units (ICU), pooled incidence of HAI caused by Enterococcus spp. and VRE was 9.6 (95% CI: 6.3-13.5; range: 0.39-36.0) and 2.6 (95% CI: 0.53-5.8; range: 0-9.7). Hospital wide, the pooled vancomycin resistance proportion among Enterococcus spp. HAI isolates was 7.3% (95% CI: 1.5-16.3; range: 2.6-11.5). In ICU, this proportion was 11.5% (95% CI: 4.7-20.1; range: 0-40.0). Among patients with hospital-acquired bloodstream infections with Enterococcus spp., pooled all-cause mortality was 21.9% (95% CI: 15.7-28.9; range: 14.3-32.3); whereas all-cause mortality attributable to VRE was 33.5% (95% CI: 13.0-57.3; range: 14.3-41.3).ConclusionsInfections caused by Enterococcus spp. are frequently identified among hospital patients and associated with high mortality.

The Containment Scouts: First Insights into an Initiative to Increase the Public Health Workforce for Contact Tracing during the COVID-19 Pandemic in Germany.

The COVID-19 pandemic in Germany has demanded a substantially larger public health workforce to perform contact tracing and contact management of COVID-19 cases, in line with recommendations of the World Health Organization (WHO). In response, the Robert Koch Institute (RKI) established the national "Containment Scout Initiative" (CSI) to support the local health authorities with a short-term workforce solution. It is part of a range of measures for strengthening the public health system in order to limit the spread of SARS-CoV-2 in Germany. The CSI is an example of how solutions to address critical health system capacity issues can be implemented quickly. It also demonstrates that medical or health-related backgrounds may not be necessary to support health authorities with pandemic-specific tasks and fulfil accurate contact tracing. However, it is a short-term solution and cannot compensate for the lack of existing qualified staff as well as other deficits that exist within the public health sector in Germany. This article describes the structure and process of the first phase of this initiative in order to support health policymakers, public health practitioners, and researchers considering innovative and flexible approaches for addressing urgent workforce capacity issues.

[Measures to cope with the COVID-19 pandemic in Germany: nonpharmaceutical and pharmaceutical interventions]. / Maßnahmen zur Bewältigung der COVID-19-Pandemie in Deutschland: nichtpharmakologische und pharmakologische Ansätze.

When the emerging novel SARS-CoV­2 virus first appeared in December 2019, neither specific therapeutic options nor vaccinations were available. The role of nonpharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) became of central importance. At the Robert Koch Institute, a multilayer strategy consisting of population-based and individual preventive measures to control the pandemic was developed, which built upon existing influenza pandemic plans as well as generic plans. This paper explains the recommended NPIs and illustrates the pharmaceutical approaches developed in parallel.Among others, general contact bans, providing material for infection prevention and control, ban of events, closing educational institutions, and restricting travel are counted among population-based measures. Additional individual preventive measures are necessary, e.g., keeping a minimum distance, reducing contacts, and wearing a mouth-nose covering as well as quarantine and isolation. Measures within the health system are based on recommendations of the Commission on Hospital Hygiene and Infection Protection (Kommission für Krankenhaushygiene und Infektionsprävention (KRINKO)) and specified and implemented by professional societies. Since November 2020, an antiviral therapy with remdesivir and treatment with the glucocorticoid dexamethasone have been available as pharmaceutical interventions. Monoclonal antibodies are at this time not approved. Therapeutic anticoagulation is recommended.Recommendations are constantly adapted to the increasing knowledge on the pathogen and its means of transmission. A challenge is to strengthen the trust of the population. Many measures have to be applied on an individual basis in order to work together.